Melanie Klein

Introduction / Einführung: Jacqueline Rose
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friends, the milieu that first brought her to intellectual life as a teenager, but after this early fleeting appearance in her book, we do not meet any of these figures again.1

Instead, the overriding impression one gets on reading Klein is that she is alone, confronting more or less single-handedly the often cruel reality of the inner world she conjures up and describes. Where on earth, my students almost invariably ask, does she get her shocking ideas? And if I always reply that the theories emerge out of her painstaking clinical work, notably her play technique with children, it also has to be acknowledged that sometimes her interpretations seem sui generis, as if they have come straight out of her own head. As Jacques Lacan put it in one of his best-known remarks on Klein: “She sticks her symbolism into him with the utmost brutality, does Melanie Klein, into little Dick” (as if, Lacan’s twisted syntax suggests, Klein and her symbolism were driving the sentence and the child).2 In Klein’s clinical world, analytic insight, in the best sense, abases itself, gets down and dirty, to the level of the spillages and missiles, the torn bits and pieces of paper littering her floor, but it also seems at moments to arrive as if by diktat, the word descending from on high.

As a concept, projective identification has become one of the most important, and contested, in psychoanalytic theory and technique. It has also post-Klein been subject to multiple re-elaborations.3 At its most simple—although it is hardly simple—it refers to the process whereby the psyche rids itself of its unwanted contents, notably its aggressive impulses, by projecting them into another person or part-object, with whom—as if already in a type of mourning for what has discarded—it then passionately identifies. It was axiomatic for Freud’s theory of repression that the mind can never dispose of its unconscious contents, which remain layer upon layer inside it like a palimpsest. Klein gives a type of spatial extension to Freud’s idea, crossing the boundary between one mind and another. In her account, we use others to get rid of the parts of our mind we cannot tolerate. But we fail. First, we cannot let go of, indeed we partly become, the one into whom we have expelled the most hated parts of ourselves. At the same time, the unwanted impulses refuse to stay in their projected place and start to retaliate. It remains to this day the most graphic account available of unconscious hostility, of the twin repulsion and attraction we feel towards those we profess to hate. Thus Klein pays her strange, disturbing, tribute to the intimacy between one mind and the next—which is why she is seen as key in the founding of “object relations” psychoanalysis. In this rendering of psychic life, no one ever belongs or keeps to their proper place.

If projective identification carries the germ of paranoia, it cannot however be simply pathologized. Projective identification, writes Julia Kristeva in her study of Klein (volume 2 of her trilogy on “Feminine Genius,” along with Hannah Arendt and Colette), is “the first step in bonding with the outside world.”4 In fact, she continues, citing psychoanalyst W. Bion, projective identification is a capacity. We cannot accept it as at work in the mind of the infant without conceding that all human life begins with such projection—the mother “dreaming” of the psyche of a newborn child.5 “The link between infant and breast,” writes Bion to his famous 1957 paper, “Attacks on Linking,” “depends on projective identification.”6 Perhaps this explains some of the corrections and changes in this paper, why Klein seems to oscillate between “projecting” and “entering,” or between “transforming” and “projective identification,” or why she adds at one point in the published

### Introduction

**Jacqueline Rose**

Melanie Klein “On Identification”

We rarely see Melanie Klein at work, at least not quite like this. It is as if we are looking over her shoulder as the contours of her theorization trace themselves across the page. When we think of Klein, the first image that comes to mind is not that of hesitancy. She had a supreme confidence, famously in her clinical interpretations, even if some of us have always suspected that such confidence was the other side of—her way of managing—the deep mental trouble and energies that she saw as her task to excavate. More perhaps than any other of Freud’s legatees, her work has become a corpus, solidified into its basic concepts—paranoid-schizoid, depressive, and projective identification—the last of which receives one of its fullest and most interesting elaborations in this paper of 1955. But here we see a different image—at once assured but also at moments faltering on the page. We see her, that is, as a writer. Reading this paper, we watch the struggle and strain of thinking that she herself did so much to theorize. Perhaps the publication of these excerpts and notes might, therefore, play its part in returning to her a vitality lost in what often feels, to the outsider, at least, as the ossification of her school. It is after all central to Klein’s vision of the mind that thinking is anguished. It never completely loses touch with the anxiety out of which it was born.

First published in 1955 in New Directions in Psycho-Analysis, which she co-edited with Paula Heimann and Roger Money-Kyrle, “On Identification” was later included in the final volume of her writing, Envy and Gratitude, in 1975.1 I did not know until reading the hitherto unpublished notes to this volume—of which we have only been able to reproduce a small selection here—how careful she was, notably in relation to the concept of envy, to embed herself in the world of literature and philosophy: from Chaucer to Goethe, from Nietzsche to Schopenhauer. No scholar will fail to recognize the slightly panicked urgency of her requests to friends and helpers to locate the sources intended to give authority and sanction to her ideas: “I spent yesterday in the Cardiff library reading Nietzsche,” Mary Langmuir writes to Klein in April 1956; “Unhappily I can not find the quotation you...”2


2 | Melanie Klein, “On Identification,” plus notes to Envy and Gratitude and Other Words (see note 1), facsimile.


7 | Ibid., p. 117; p. 72.

version, “In normal development,” at another, “It would appear,” as if she were hedging her theoretical bets before she has finally to come down on one side or the other. Is projective identification a form of creative transformation? Is it a form of empathetic entering into, or a greedy seizing of, the mind of another? Is it normal or pathological? To which question, as these alterations suggest, the answer must surely be both. The world of the psyche is multivalent. The urge to projective identification, Klein writes in a footnote, arises from “a variety of causes,” not from greed alone. A footnote quotes Freud approvingly as he urges us not to see as pathological the conflict between “the various identifications into which the ego comes apart.”

If splitting and projection weaken the ego, she adds in another note, the disintegration of the ego “is never complete as long as life exists!” (although this striking phrase only appears in the published version). Compare too these versions: “the process by which one comes to feel identified” (facsimile), “the feeling of identification” (published version). Note the shift from verb to noun, how a tentative trajectory (“process . . . comes to feel”) settles or even hardens into place, now suddenly concrete, no longer finding its way, but arrived (“the feeling of identification”).

It is a novel by French writer Julien Green, If I Were You (Si j’étais vous, 1947), that Klein uses to illustrate her concept of projective identification, the material being so “rich,” she writes, that it leads her to analyze its central character, Fabien, “almost as if he were a patient.” That “as if” is eloquent. Klein seems to know that what she is doing is a type of violence to writing—she knows, we could almost say, that her reading of this work cannot proceed without her own form of projective identification, as she sees her theories everywhere incarnated in the literary text. Dissatisfied with his lot, Fabien enters into a Faustian pact with the devil, who grants him the magic formula to enter into and take over the identity of anyone whom he wishes to be. Projective identification does indeed have something magical about it (one of Klein’s most famous essays on creativity turns on Ravel’s opera The Magic Word). In one of his later papers on projective identification, Klein’s contemporary and colleague, Herbert Rosenfeld, cites Edith Jacobson on “early identification mechanisms of a magic nature,” where the self blends magically with its objects, or even becomes them.

Seeming to enact this process to the letter, If I Were You is indeed one of those fictions that has something of the aura of a case study. And one can see the temptation, as Fabien slowly makes his way home to his mother after his mostly disastrous transformations, to see his trajectory as a cure. In fact, one way of reading this paper is in terms of the theoretical elaboration of the cure—in its opening pages, Klein insists that she is taking her ideas from verb to noun, how a tentative trajectory (“process . . . comes to feel”) settles or even hardens into place, now suddenly concrete, no longer finding its way, but arrived (“the feeling of identification”).

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The Dawn of Day 204

Wishing to be mistaken...
Feudal people with more discriminative sects refuse to become more intimately acquainted with their rivals in order to feel superior to them.

The Dawn of Day 304

The destroyers of the world...

Suppose some one failed in something in the end he would angrily exclaim: "Would that this child would come to such a ruin!" This abominable wish is the height of envy, which seems because I can not have a same thing. The whole world shall have nothing! The whole world shall be nothing!

Then Spoke Zarathustra - On The Need of Abuse.
What I not with an ability in order that my long legs may escape the notice of all those enemies and malicious folks around me?

If I had not pity for their pity, for the pity of their ensnare and malicious folk!
Dear Helen,

The background of my note to you about the reviews was that when you received it I was quite satisfied, and that the Times had reviewed the book, and I was surprised that they reviewed it at all. It was certainly an improvement. Consequently when I received it, I was surprised and disappointed. I understood the Times to be critical at least no more, like "representation," as being simply routine objections to any new scientific work; whereas the point about "object-relations," taking "networks" into account, is one of major importance.

May question: "Have you said any such thing?" I can't recall anything of course rhetorical. Then, I must have been the reviewer who described the idea that you are abandoning instead. I hope you might take an opportunity to contradict such a statement.

From your reply: "I think you don't quite appreciate my point here. It is not a matter of there, appreciating my point here. It is not a matter of there, appreciating my point here. It is not a matter of there, appreciating my point here. It is not a matter of there, appreciating my point here. It is not a matter of there, appreciating my point here. It is not a matter of there, appreciating my point here. It is not a matter of there, appreciating my point here. I don't think I understood your point at all, as you repeated it: it wasn't understood.

(Underline in your work, of course, the following sentence: "The author should state his hypotheses explicitly, so that each reader may readily see where the author's thinking is directed."

I am not going to go into the personal side of your letter, which was simply incredible to me--I was shocked by the realization of you're changing me so with. Discovering a person with whom I work is also fantastic. I was trained in your work, and I can't seem to understand the blank in your name. So, I think you're identifying me with her, because I don't understand her sense of style.

I do feel that in some ways people may be less free to lose their own ideas, so that "tactfully," it is not a place to lose scientific work. These are always been your favorite--most nutraceutical supportive of your work. I think given you no ground, all for supporting that it's been changed.

In your letters you mention your Enemy paper as again showing how you cannot object to relation--object interrelation--in what I am going to try in real criticism or doubt. I am leaping you will make it clearer--the book how 'small story' can arise. The idea is not clear in itself. It implies an object relation before thought--a difficult proposition to many people. If you have more on the moment it needs to be thought, you need to discuss it fully to give your evidence for it. The difficulty is in Macedo's letter to you about it, which is summarized. It should not be adopted. You may be right, it seems to be. If you have more on the moment it should be worked out in the book of evidence, so that it should be part forward as a specification, which Free fits about the "b" and "c" interrelation, leaving, giving all the evidence in order. There is no criticism in any obvious thing. I am sorry not to neglect in his interest of your work, which I believe you can appreciate.

Hoping you will soon receive your family for me as a friend, I am

Yours ever

Joan
Einführung

Melanie Klein, »Über Identifizierung«


der projektiven Identifizierung benutzt, denn, wie sie schreibt, ist das Material so ‚reich’, dass es sie dazu veranlasste, die Hauptfigur Fabien ‚ungefähr so‘ zu analysieren, ‚als sei er ein Patient‘.12 Dieses ‚so‘ als ob ist vielleicht. Klein scheint sich bewusst zu sein, dass sie dem Schreiben eine Art Gewalt anut – sie weiß darum, so könnte man fast sagen, dass ihre Interpretation dieses Werks selbst ohne ihre eigene Form der projektiven Identifizierung nicht von der Stelle kommt, sieht sie doch ihre Theorien überall in dem literarischen Text verwirklicht. Aus Unzufriedenheit mit seinem Schicksal lässt sich Fabien auf einen faustischen Pakt mit dem Teufel ein, der ihm die Zauberformel ‚Das Zauberwort‘ gibt.13 In einem seiner späteren Vorträge über projektive Identifizierung zitiert Kleins Zeitgenosse und Kollege Herbert Rosenfeld Edith Jacobson mit ‚frühen Identifizierungsmechanismen magischer Arts‘, bei denen das Selbst sich auf magische Weise mit seinen Objekten vermischt oder gar zu ihnen wird.14


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12 | Ebd., S. 152; Faksimile, S. 28.
14 | Herbert Rosenfeld, »Zur Psycho-pathologie psychotischer Zustände: Die Bedeutung der projektiven Identifizierung für die Ich-Struktur und die Objektbeziehungen des psychotischen Patienten«, in: Melanie Klön heute (wie Anm. 5), S. 146–173.
15 | Kristeva, Das zölibale Genre (wie Anm. 6), S. 306.
Introduction

In "Dreaming and Melancholia", Freud has shown the intrinsic connection between identification and introjection. His discovery of the superego and the awareness of the introjection of the father and identification with him have led to the recognition that identification as a sequel to introjection is part of normal development. Since this discovery, introjection and identification have played a central role in psychoanalytic thought and research.

Before stating the actual topic of this paper, I think it would be helpful to recapitulate a few of the main concepts underlying my conclusions:

1. Normal development can be traced back to introjection in the earliest stages of infancy; the primal internalized objects form the basis of complex personality structures and identification.
2. Preoedipal anxiety, arising at the phallic stage, is the first form of anxiety, which is followed by depressive anxiety; introjection and projection operate from the beginning of postnatal life and constantly interact. This interaction both builds up the internal world and shapes the picture of external reality.
3. The inner world consists of objects, first of all the mother, internalized in various aspects and material situations. The relationship between these internalized figures and the actual environment is felt – when preoedipal anxiety dominates – as mainly hostile and dangerous; they are felt to be loving and good when preoedipal anxiety is experienced and held in check.

References:

(1) 1947. "Introduction", in B. S. R. (ed.), Hogarth Press. Abraham's work on melancholia, as early as in "The Psychoanalytical Investigation of Melancholia and Allied Conditions" and later, in "The Interpretation of Dreams" and other works, is of great importance in understanding the concept of introjection and its role in mental illness. See "The Interpretation of Dreams" (1909), Hogarth Press.

This inner world, which can be described in terms of internal relations and hangings, is the product of the infant's own impulses, emotions, and fantasies. It is of course profoundly influenced by the good and bad experiences from external sources. But at the same time it defines the perception of the external world in a way that is no less decisive for his development. The mother, first of all her breast, is the primal object for both the infant's introjective and projective processes. Love and hatred are from the beginning projected on to her, and conversely she is internalized with similar feelings. These two contrasting primal emotions towards the mother underlie the infant's feeling that a good and a bad mother (breast) exist. The more the mother and her breast are connected with libido — and the extent of the cathexis depends on a combination of internal and external factors — the more securely will the internalized good breast, the prototype of good internal objects, be established in the infant's mind. Thus in turn influences both the strength and the nature of projections, in particular it determines whether feelings of love or destructive impulses predominate in them.

(1) This is based on the beginning of life the mother's attitude is of vital importance and remains a major factor in the development of the child. (26, p. 141, unpublished in P.S.S.S., paper presented at the International Congress of Child Welfare).

(2) To put it in terms of the two instincts, it is a question whether in the struggle between the life and death instincts the life instinct prevails.

I have in various connections described the infant's earliest speculations directed against the mother. I found that aggressive impulses and speculations arising in the earliest relation to the mother's breast, such as sucking the breast dry and scooping it out, soon lead to further speculations of covering the mother and robbing her of the contents of her body. Simultaneously, the infant experiences impulses and speculations of attacking the mother by putting encountering into her. In such speculations, products of the body and parts of the self are felt to have been split off, projected into the mother, and to be continuing their existence within her. These speculations seem aimed to the father and to other people. I also considered the psychological anxiety and the fear of retaliation, which result from these ambivalent speculations, underlie the development of paranoia and antisocialism.

It is not only what are felt to be destructive and "bad" parts of the self which are split off and projected into another person, but also parts which are felt to be good and valuable. I have pointed out earlier that from the beginning of life the infant's first object, the mother's breast (and the mother), is connected with libido and that this vitalizes the way in which the mother is internalized. This in turn is of great importance for the relation with her as an external and internal object. The process by which the mother is connected with libido underlie mechanisms of projecting good feelings and good parts of the self into her.

In the course of further work, it also became clear that the major importance for identification of certain projective mechanisms which are complementary to the introjective ones. The process by which the infant identifies under the feeling of identification...
with other people, because distributed qualities or attitudes of one's own to them, are generally taken for granted even before the corresponding concept was incorporated in psycho-analytic theory. For instance, the projective mechanism underlying empathy is familiar in every-day life. Phenomena well-known in psychiatry, e.g., a patient's feeling that he actually is Christ, God, a king, a famous person, are bound up with projection. The mechanisms underlying such phenomena, however, had not been investigated in such detail then, in my "Notes on Some Redundant Mechanisms", I suggested the term "projective identification" for those processes which formed part of the paranoia-identific position. The conclusion I arrived at in that paper were, however, based on some of my earlier findings, in particular on that of the infantile anal and anal-somatic...


(2) In this connection I wish to refer to the papers by M. Fisher ("Analysis of a Schizophrenic State with Superimposition", 1947, J.J.P.-A. XVII) and "Dreams on the Relation of Male Dominance in Paranoia, Paranoiac Identity and Mania", 1960, J.J.P.-A. XXII, and "A note on the Psychopathology of Combinational States in Chronic Schizophrenics", 1960, J.J.P.-A. XXIII) which are relevant to these problems.

breath as a focal point in the ego, from which good feelings can be projected onto external objects. It strengthens the ego, counteracts the processes of splitting and dispersal and enhances the capacity for integration and synthesis. It is one of the preconditions for an integrated and stable ego and for good object relations. The tendency towards integration, which is concurrent with splitting, I assume to be from earliest infancy. One of the main factors underlying the need for integration in the individual's feeling that integration implies being alive.

Here I wish to go somewhat beyond my paper on "Schizophrenia."

One I would suggest that a securely established good object, implying a securely established love for it, gives the ego a feeling of riches and abundance which allows for an outpouring of libido and projection of good parts of the self into the external world without a sense of depletion arising. The ego would then also feel that it is able to re-inject the love it has given out as well as take in goodness from other sources and thus be enriched by the whole process. In other words, in such cases there is a balance between giving out and taking in, between projection and introjection.

I have maintained in "Schizophrenia", that the fear of annihilation by the destructive forces within is the deepest fear of all. In 5

so far as splitting is a primal defence against this fear, it is up to a point effective, since a dispersal of anxiety and a cutting off of emotions comes about, but it does not succeed in so far as it results in a feeling of death. For that is what disintegration, splitting off of emotions and a feeling of chaos amount to. The sufferings of the schizophrenic are, I think, not fully appreciated because he appears to be devoid of emotions.
Furthermore, whenever an object is taken in, in states of identification and loss, this affects the ego in which the ego splits and projects, and I suggested then, there are a variety of splitting processes (about which we have still a good deal to discover) and in their nature must be of great importance for the development of the ego. The feeling of containing a complete nipple and breast - although associating with phantasies of a breast deprived and therefore in this - has the effect that splitting and projecting are not predominantly related to fragmented parts of the ego personality but to more coherent parts of the self. This implies that the ego is not exposed to a total scattering by dispersal and for this reason is more capable of repeatedly undressing splitting and reconstructing integration and synthesis in the relation to objects.

Conversely, the breast taken in with love, and therefore felt to be constructive, became the prototype of all good internal objects, drives the ego to further splitting and becomes the representative of the death-instinct within.

I have already mentioned that concurrently with the internalization of the good breast, the external mother too is invested with libidinal significance. In various ways, Freud has described this process and some of its implications. For instance, referring to identification in a love relation, he states that this object is being treated in the same way as our own ego, so that when we are in love a considerable amount of narcissistic libido overflows on to the object... We love it on account of the perfections which we have striven to reach for our own ego. ...

(1) 1921, Group Psychology, p. 74
(2) Anna Freud has described another aspect of the projection on to a loved object and identification with it in her concept of 'infantile surrender.' The Ego and the Mechanisms of Defence

In my view, the processes which Freud describes imply that this loved object in fact contains the split-off loved and valued part of the self, which in this way continues its existence inside the object. It thereby becomes an extension of the self.

The above is a brief summary of my findings presented in 'Notes on Some Sexual Mechanisms.' I have not intentionally confused myself, however, to the point of discussing them but have added a few further suggestions which were implied but not explicitly stated in that paper. I now propose to compile some of these findings in an analysis of a story which until now has been shrouded in silence.

(2) ...by the French novelist, Jules Janin, in his contribution to the book, 'La vie en amour.'


(2) cf. also "Some Theoretical Conclusions regarding the Emotional Life of the Infant", DEVELOPMENTS IN PSYCHO-ANALYSIS (1952), pages 202, 3.
The author of this novel has deep insight into the unconscious mind. In the way he depicts the events and characters and - which he of particular interest here - by choice or people into whom Fabian projects himself. It is in this remarkable fashion which makes the novel so interesting.

My interest in Fabian’s personality and adventures, illustrating as they do none of the complex and still obscure problems of projective identification, led me to attempt an analysis of this rich material almost as if he were a patient.

Before discussing projective identification, which will be the main thesis of this book, I shall consider the interaction between introjective and projective processes which I think, above all, illustrated in the novel. For instance, the author describes Fabian’s urge to pass off the stage. However, he notes this into the all-devouring night he had a sensation of being lifted gently above the world. It was as it were the very effort of passing into open a sort of gulf in himself, corresponding to the giddy depths into which his imagination seemed to be aware. This, I think, is the process that Fabian is simultaneously looking into distance and into himself, finding in the sky and the stars as well as projecting into the sky and stars his mind behind. The idea of the stars, I would also interpret his feeling of losing the stars as an attempt to regain his good objects which he feels are lost or far away.

Another aspect of Fabian’s introjective identifications is the light on his projective pronouncements. In one scene when he is alone in his room at night he feels, as he often does, that he is the “first one of the others” coming from the other inhabitants of the building around him.” Fabian lays his father’s gold watch on the table; he has a great affection for it and particularly likes it because of its “beauty and glisten and the clearly marked figures on its face.” In a vague way this watch also gives him a feeling of confidence, as it lies on the table among his papers in fear that the whole room acquire an air of greater order and authority, perhaps only in the fancy and yet convincing.

sound of its ticking, comforting said the prevailing stillness.** Brand, looking at the clock and listening to its ticking, was upon the hour of joy and glory in his father’s life which had ticked away, and it seemed to his alive and independent of his dead father came. In an earlier passage the author says that even since childhood Fabian had been haunted by a feeling of new honor which, in some way which he could not describe, was ever beyond the reach of his own consciousness. ** I would conclude that the watch had some quality of a fatherly nature, such as order and correctness, which it imparted to him and in a deeper sense to himself. In other words, the watch stood for the good internalized father whom he seems ever present. This aspect of the super-ego, which links with the highly moral and orderly attitude of the father, is in contrast to his father’s passions and his “gay” life, of which the ticking of the watch is a reminder to Fabian. Perhaps identified with his father’s mind as an object, so we see him in his setting off the stage as his companion of means — although such success did not afford him such satisfaction.

Yet another aspect of the internalized father appears in the shape of the Devil. For we read that when the Devil is on his way to him, Fabian hears footsteps ascending on the stairs: “He began to feel those thudding footsteps as a pulse beating in his own temples.” A little later, when faced to face with the Devil, it seems to lie to that “the figure in front of him would go on rising and rising until it spread like a darkness through the whole room.” Then, I think, expresses the internalization of the devil (the bad father), the darkness indicating also the terror he felt at having taken in such a sinister object. At a later point, when Fabian is travelling in a carriage with the Devil, he falls asleep and dreams that his companion edged along the seat towards him and that his voice “seemed to wrap itself about him, lapping his ears, checking him with its icy stare.” I see in that Fabian’s fear not only.
of the bad object introjected into him. In my "Notes on Some Oedipal Mechanisms", I described these fears as a consequence of the tendency to introject into another person, i.e. of projective identification. The external object introjected into the self and the hostile internalized object have a good deal in common, and therefore these two anxieties are closely linked and act to reinforce each other. This relation with the devil seems to me, I think, Pailin's early feelings about his complex with his father — the sadistic father felt to be bad. On the other hand, the moral component of his internalized objects can be seen in the Devil's moral concept of the "host of the flesh": 

The aspect was influenced by Pailin's identification with the moral and aesthetic mother, the devil thus representing simultaneously both parents. 

I have indicated some aspects of his father which Pailin has internalized. The excessiveness was a source of never-fitting conflict in him, which was increased by the actual conflict between his parents and had been perpetuated by his introjection of the parents in his unhappy relation to each other. The various ways in which he identified himself with his parents were so over-conspicuous as one can imagine. 

The persecution and depression arising from the inner relations contributed much to Pailin's loneliness, his restless mood and his urge to escape from his hated self. 

The writer quotes in his preface Milton's line: "Then art born (0) more imprisonment the Disease of oneself."

One evening, when Pailin had been walking indolently through the streets, the idea of returning to his own loneliness fills him with horror. He knows (1)

(1) The various and contradictory characteristics — both good and bad — with which the father, as well as the mother, are endowed are a familiar feature in the development of the child's object relations. Similarity such conflicting attitudes are also attributed to the internalized fathers seen from the penis-area. 

(2) I have suggested ("Notes on Some Oedipal Mechanisms") that projective identification arises during the penis-oriented position which is characterized by splitting and projective identifications. I have pointed out above that in the depression and his feeling of worthlessness gave additional tension to his mood to escape from his self. 

The tendency group was heated with characteristics of depression. Against de-
(1) In "The Ego and the Id" (1923) Freud writes on page 38: "If they, the object-identifications, obtain the upper hand and become too numerous, unduly tense and incompatible with one another, a pathological outcome will not be far off. It may come to a disrupting of the ego in consequence of the individual identifications becoming cut off from one another by resistances; perhaps the secret of cases of so-called multiple personality is that the various identifications seize possession of consciousness in turn. Even when things do not go so far as this, there remains the question of conflicts between the different identifications into which the ego is split up, conflicts which cannot after all be described as purely pathological."

in ohan's relations to his primal objects, mother and father. Indicators from the external world at last and again taken in, and put out - re-introspected and re-projected. Ohan's ego, as can be gathered from the novel, is reinforced by his self-centered and the urge to escape from his own personality.

II

My interpretation of the novel implies that the author has presented fundamental aspects of emotional life on two planes: the experiences of the infant and their influence on the life of the adult. In these last pages I have touched on one of the infantile emotions, animism, introjection and projection which I tried to underline in Ohan's adult character and experiences.

I shall substantiate these assumptions by discussing some further episodes which I have not mentioned in the account of the novel. Representing the various incidents from this angle, I am not following the chronological order of the book, I am rather considering them as the expression of certain aspects of infantile development - not that these only point to one chronological order, for we have to remember that in infancy emotional experiences are not only consecutive but to a large extent simultaneous.

There is an interest in the novel which seems to be of fundamental importance for understanding Ohan's early development. While Togo has gone to school very depressed about his poverty, his inadequacy, and full of fear that he might not be able to change himself into someone else, I believe he sees that it is a bright, sunny morning. Be dresses more carefully than usual, goes out and sitting 1.
the sunshine, because sloated. All faces around him appear to be beautiful.

He also feels that in this admission of beauty there is no beauty of that
lustful coquetry which was so apt to poison even his moments of really
serious contemplations. On the contrary, he simply admired and with a touch
of almost religious respect. However, he soon feels hungry because he has
had no breakfast, and to this he attributes a slight feeling of frigidity which
he experiences together with hopelessness and elation. He realizes, though,
that this state of elation is also dangerous and just he must spur himself
on to action so as to turn himself into somebody else; but first of all he is
driven by hunger to find some food. He goes into a baker's shop to buy a
roll. The very smell of flour and warm bread always reminds him of child-
hood holidays in the country with a house full of children. I would suggest
that the whole shop turns in his mind into the finding mother. He is im-
gressed in looking at a large basket of fresh rolls and stretches his hand out towards
then when he hears a woman's voice adding him what he wants. At this he jumps
with a start like he has been suddenly woken up. He also calls good -
like a child-field - he begins to touch her and is surprised that he is afraid
to do so. He is entranced by her beauty and feels that for her sake he could
give up all his thoughts and hopes. In watching with delight all her moves
when she hands him roll, he touches on her breasts, since otherwise he can
see under her clothing. The whiteness of her skin intensifies him and he is
filled with an irresistible desire to put his hands round her waist. As soon

(1) This state of elation is, I think, comparable to the self-fulfilling
hallucination (fear) which the infant under the stress of reality, in
particular of hunger, cannot maintain long.

as he has left the shop he is overwhelmed with misery. He suddenly
leaves his place in the crowd and resumes his position with his small black shoes...
... in order to insult the existence of bread itself. Then he remembers that
the woman had touched him and in a passion of intense desire he hits furiously
into the thickest part of the roll. He attacks even the paper by crushing
them in his pocket and at the same time feels as if a crumb were sticking
like a stone in his throat. He is in agony. Something was beating and fluttering
in his stomach, but something huge and heavy. In
thinking again of the woman, he concludes with bitterness that he has never been
loved. All his affairs with girls had been casual and he had never before
encountered in a woman 'that fulness of breast the very thought of which was now

torturing him with its persistent urge.' He decides to return to the shop to
have at least another look at her, for his desires seem to be 'burning him up.'
He finds her even more desirable and feels that his looking at her almost amounts
to touching her. Then he sees a man talking to her, with her head laid
affectionately on her 'milky-white' arm. The woman sits in the sun and they
discuss plans for the evening. It occurs to him that he will never forget
this scene, 'every detail being invested with tragic importance.' The words
which the man had spoken to her still sound in his ears. He cannot
exclude the sound of that voice which from somewhere within him went on speaking yet.

In despair he covers his eyes with his hands. He cannot remember any occasion
when he has suffered so acutely from his desires.

I see in the details of this episode Interior's powerfully reviled desire
for his mother's breast with the ensuing frustration and hatred; his wish to trample on the bread with his black shoes expresses his sadistic
attacks, and his furiously biting into the roll his own desire and his oral
sadistic impulses. The whole situation appears to be internalized; and
internal situation, for he feels that he can hear inside him the voice of the woman. I conclude that the incident which he has watched with such strong emotions represents the primal scene which he has internalized in the past. When, in this emotional state, he covers his eyes with his hand and turns away, I think the young infant's mind may have been set in motion in the primal scene.

The next part of this chapter deals with Fabian-Fraga's sense of guilt about his desires which he feels he must destroy "as bad as it is, as it is wrong."

He goes into a church only to find that there is no holy water in the stoup, then it is "holy," and he is indignant about such neglect of religious duties. He kneels down in a state of depression and thinks that it would need a miracle to relieve his guilt and consults a priest who suggests religion which has reappeared at this moment. Soon his complaints and accusations turn against God. Why had he created him to be "a sick and bedraggled soul, a poisoned rat?"

Then he remembers an old book telling about the sin of the serpent. He might have come

to life but had remained unborn. It was then a question of choice for God, and this thought comforts him. He even becomes elated because he is alive and he feels his arm with both hands as if to assure himself of the being of his heart. Then he reflects that these are childish ideas, but concludes that "truth itself" is "the essence of a child." Immediately after that the author describes how Fabian-Fraga places cotton candy in all the vacant places of the stand. An internal voice tempts him again, saying how beautiful it would be to see the baker woman in the light of all these little cotton candies.

My conclusion is that his guilt and despair relate to the destruction of the external and internal mother and her breasts, and to the murderous rivalry with his father, that is to say, that the feeling that his good internal and external objects were destroyed by him, this depressive anxiety was linked with his external mother. For God, she stood for the father, was aroused by having made him a bad and poisoned creature. He fluctuates between this conclusion and others. He is elated and a feeling of satisfaction that he has been created and alive. I suggest that the scale which had never come to life sized for Fabian's unborn brothers and sisters. The fact that he had demeaned an only child was both a cause for guilt and - since he had been chosen to be born while they had not - a cause of satisfaction and gratitude to the father. For a conception of a child. It's the religious idea that truth is "the essence of a child" that takes on another significance. The greatest act of creation is to create a child, for this means perpetuating life. I suggest that when Fabian-Fraga puts cotton candy in all the vacant places in the stand and lights them, this means单元 the mother pregnant and bringing to life the unborn babies. The wish to see the bakerswoman in the light of the cotton candies would thus express the desire to see her pregnant with all the babies that would give her. Here we find the "childish" incorporation desire for the mother as well as the tendency to repel by giving her all the babies that he had destroyed. In this connection his hallucination about the "holy-water" stoup has not only religious basis. I see in
The processes underlying projective identification are very concretely depicted by the author. One part of Fehlau literally leaves his self and enters into his victim, an event which in both parties is accompanied by strong physical sensations. We are told that the split-off part of Fehlau submerges in varying degrees in his objects and loses the memories and characteristics appertaining to the original Fehlau. We would, therefore, conclude (in keeping with the author's very concrete conception of the projective process) that Fehlau's memories and other aspects of his personality are left behind (in externalized) when in Fehlau and that he must have retained a good deal of his ego when the split occurred. This part of Fehlau, lying dormant until the split-off aspects of his personality return, represents in my view that component of the ego which patients unconsciously feel they have retained while other parts are projected into the external world and lost.

The spatial and temporal terms in which the author describes the events are actually the ones in which our patients experience these processes. Thus...
processes. But such phantasies have far-reaching consequences and vitally influence the ego. They have the effect that those parts of his self from which he feels estranged, often including his emotions, are not at the time accessible either to the analyst or to the patient. The feeling that he does not know who he has dispersed himself, where parts of him are, in the source of great anxiety and insecurity.

I shall next consider Freud’s projective identifications from three angles: (1) the relation of the split-off and projected parts of his personality to those he has left behind; (2) the motive within—underlying the choice of objects into which he projects himself, and (3) how far in these processes the projected part of his self becomes submerged in the object or gains control over it.

(1) There is another side to such experiences, as Haveline Heimann describes in her monograph in this book (p. ). A patient’s conscious feelings can also express his splitting processes.

(2) I have suggested in “Schizophrenia” that the fear of being imprisoned inside the author as a consequence of projective identification underlies various anxiety situations and more, than claustrophobia. I would now add that projective identification may result in the fear that the lost part of self will never be recovered because it is buried in the object. In the story, Faust dies both after his transformation into Paganini and into Faustus—that he is imprisoned and will never escape again. This implies that he will die inside his objects. There is another point I wish to add here: Exposed to the fear of being imprisoned inside the author as underlying claustrophobia, I have found that the fear relating to the inside of one’s own body and the dangers threatening there is another contributory factor to claustrophobia. To quote again Heimann’s lines: “Thus art become (6 worst imprisonment) the Daemons of myself”.

was a presentation for Paflan’s passionate need to find his lost self again, that is to say for integration. Even before his transmutations occurred, the longing to recover the lost part of his personality—whom he had been lost appeared to be ideal—had, as I suggested, contributed to the insomnia and restlessness, had given impetus to his projective identifications and was complemented by his self-hatred, which was another factor compelling him to force himself into other people. The search for the lost ideal self, which is an important feature of mental life, inevitably includes the search for the lost ideal objects; for the good self is that part of the personality which is felt to be in a loving relation to its good objects. The prototype of such a relation is the bond between the holy and its mother. In fact, when Paflan finds his lost self, he also recovers his love for his mother.

With Paflan we note that he seemed incapable of an identification with a good or admired object. A variety of reasons would have to be discussed in this connection, but I wish to single out one as a possible explanation. I have already suggested that in order to identify strongly with an admired and loved figure it is essential to feel that there is within the self enough womanliness or with the object. Since Paflan had lost—so it seemed—his good self, his exemplary idol did not feel that there was enough goodness within him for identification with a very good object. There might also have been fear, anxiety, which characterized such states of mind. But an admired object should be taken into another world which is too much deprived of goodness. The good object is then kept outside (with Paflan, I think, the distant stars). But when Paflan rediscovered his good

(1) I believe that the feeling of having dispersed into the external world goodness and good parts of the self adds to the sense of grieflessness and envy of others who are left to contain the lost goodness.

(1) Freud’s concept of the ego ideal was, as we know, the precursor of the superego. But there are some features of the ego ideal which have not been fully taken over into his super-ego concept. My description of the ideal self which Paflan in ideal is closer to Freud’s original views of the ego.
self, then he found his great objects as well and could identify with them.

In the story the coalition part of Fabian also comes to be admired with
the other half, Fabian-Quelli, wants to make him whole. The former Fabian-Quelli comes to the house, the more
resistant Fabian grows on his nickbed. He regains consciousness and wakes up to the
man through which his other half, Fabian-Quelli, mother to the name formula.
According to the author's description, the two halves of Fabian are longing to be
redounded. This means that Fabian was longing to integrate his self. As we
have seen, this urge was bound up with a growing capacity to love. This would be
necessary with Freud's emphasis that synthesis is a function of the libido —
ultimately of the love instinct.

I have suggested in an earlier article that although parents search for a
good father, Fabian was unable to find him because every word, increased by
grievance and hatred, determined his choice. But he becomes more and more
tolerant, his objects appear to him in a better light; but time is also less
demanding than he was in the past. It appears that he no longer claims that
his parents should be ideal and therefore he can forgive them for their
shortcomings. To the greater capacity for love corresponds a diminution of hatred,
and this in turn results in a lessening of feelings of persecution — all of which
has a bearing on the lessening of greed. Self-hatred was one of the outstanding
features in Fabian's character; together with the greater capacity for love and
tolerance towards others arose the greater tolerance and love towards his own
self.

In the end Fabian has recovered his love for his mother and makes his peace
with her. It is significant that he recognizes her lack of tenderness but feels
that she might have been better had he been a better son. He shows his mother's
injunction to pray and seems to have recovered after all his struggles his belief
and trust in God. Fabian's last words are "Our Father", and I would suggest that

At that moment, even he filled with love for humanity, the love for his
father return. These persecutory and deprecatory anxieties which were bound
to be stirred up by the approach of death would be to some extent counteracted
by localization and solution.

As we have seen, Fabian-Quelli is driven here by an irresistible impulse.
It seems probable that his sense of impending death gave impulse to his urge to
find himself. For I believe that the fear of death which he has denied,
although he knew of its severe illness, has come out in full force. Maybe he
denied this fear because its nature was so intensely persecutory. He knew
how full of grievances he was against fate, against his parents, how persecuted
he felt by his own unsatisfactory personality. In my experience the fear of
death is very much intensified if death is felt as an attack by hostile internal
and external objects or if it arouses depressive anxiety lest the good objects be
destroyed by these hostile figures. (These persecutory and depressive phantas-
ies may of course co-exist.) Anxiety in a psychic nature are the cause
for this excessive fear of death from which many individuals suffer throughout
their lives; and the intense mental suffering which, as a few observations
have shown me, some people experience at this deathbed are due in my view to
the revival of infantile psychotic anxieties.

Considering that the author describes Fabian as a restless and unhappy
person, full of grievances, one would expect that his death should be painful
and give rise to the persecutory anxieties which I have just mentioned. However,
this is not what happens in the story, for Fabian dies happily and at peace.
My explanation for this sudden ending can only be tentative. From the artistic
point of view it was probably the author's best solution. But, in keeping with
my conception of Fabian's experiences which I have put forward in this paper,
I am inclined to explain this unexpected ending by the story presenting to us
two sides of Poland. Up to the point where the transformations begin, it is the adult Polish who we meet. In the course of his transformations we encounter the ambivalence, the personality and depressive anxieties which characterized, as I believe, his early development. In the three days covered by the novel, he has traversed a world of emotional experience which in my view entails a working through of the paranoid-schizoid and the depressive positions. As a result of overcoming the fundamental psychotic anxiety of infancy, the intrinsic need for integration comes out in full force. He achieves integration concurrently with good object relations and thereby repairs what had gone wrong in his life.
Introduction / Einführung:
Jacqueline Rose

Melanie Klein

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